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Australian Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Climate Change 
 
Abstract 
The international governance of climate change was initially informed by two norms 
concerning who should take responsibility for mitigating climate change, and how such 
mitigation should be pursued. Since the early 1990s, these normative structures have been 
challenged and altered through the process of contestation. In this paper I will argue that 
the resulting changes are a product of the perceived incongruence between these 
structures and the domestic conditions of those states they seek to govern. Following an 
overview of the emergence and contestation of the normative structures of climate 
governance, I will elaborate on this relationship between international norms and 
domestic conditions. These theoretical assumptions will then be explored in a more 
substantive fashion through a consideration of Australia’s participation in international 
efforts to mitigate climate change. As I will demonstrate, the perceived incongruence of 
the normative structures of climate governance with domestic conditions led Australia’s 
foreign policy-makers to contest these structures and focus on the construction of 
alternative governance processes. In the final section of the paper, I will explain how 
Australia’s foreign policy-makers have re-framed the issue of climate change to evade the 
immense challenge posed by the original norms of climate governance to Australia’s 
foreign policy traditions. The diversion of attention away from historical emissions to 
future emissions and possible technological mitigation options, has temporarily 
reconciled the governance of climate change with Australia’s domestic conditions, albeit 





The Government is doing a lot, but in the end, what the Australian Government does is 
going to be of negligible importance compared to what China does or the United States 
does or India does – that’s where you’ve got to really address this issue.  
 
Alexander Downer, 2006. 
 
 
In his defence of the Australian Government’s response to the threat of global climate change, Alexander 
Downer exposes the vast gulf that has grown between the early normative structures of climate governance 
and those that have established dominance in Australia today. Initially, the international governance of 
climate change was informed by two norms concerning who should take responsibility for mitigating 
climate change, and how such mitigation should be pursued. These norms stipulated that developed 
countries should take the lead in controlling greenhouse gas emissions, and that mitigation should be 
pursued via domestic targets and timetables. However, upon consideration of Australia’s material and 
ideational conditions, it soon becomes evident that these norms pose an immense challenge to the inherited 
objectives of foreign policy-making in Australia. Rather than questioning these objectives and re-
considering them in light of the challenge of climate change, Australian foreign policy-makers have 
vigorously sought to reconcile the domestic conditions with the governance of climate change by re-
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Prof. Timothy Doyle and two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions and comments on 
an earlier draft of this paper. 
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framing the issue and constructing alternative governance structures. Central to this re-framing is a 
diversion of attention away from historical emissions to future emissions and possible technological 
mitigation options. The governance of climate change thereby becomes a task of developing technological 
measures for controlling greenhouse gas emissions in those countries that are likely to be major emitters in 
the future, namely China and India. Such an approach marks a significant departure from the original 
normative structures of climate governance. To understand this shift it is necessary to explore the 
relationship between international norms and domestic conditions and, more specifically, the importance of 
congruence. Firstly, though, I will turn my attention to the emergence of climate change as an issue of 
international political concern to introduce the norms which initially guided state behaviour and shaped 
inter-governmental negotiating agendas. 
 
THE NORMATIVE STRUCTURES OF CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Since climate change first appeared on the international political agenda in the late 1980s, the normative 
structures of climate governance have been subject to increasing contestation. Initially, however, these 
nascent structures were built upon two principal ideas concerning who should take responsibility for 
mitigating climate change, and how such mitigation should be pursued. The first norm stipulated that 
international efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions should be guided by the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (hereinafter referred to as CBDR) (Bodansky 
1993, 503).2 The second norm stipulated that climate change mitigation should be achieved through 
domestic targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
As Hoffmann (2005, 8-12) has noted, the negotiations on ozone depletion set a precedent for universal 
participation in responding to transnational environmental problems, however this was clearly understood 
in the context of differentiated responsibilities and commitments. The Montreal Protocol on the control of 
ozone depleting substances required developed countries to meet their targets within five years, while 
developing countries were granted a concession of ten years to meet their targets (UNEP, 1999). By the late 
1980s, the universal participation norm was deeply embedded in environmental governance and its 
application to the climate change negotiations was generally unquestioned by states in the North and South, 
non-governmental organisations, intergovernmental organisations, and scientists (Hoffmann 2005, 158). 
Like the Montreal Protocol, the Framework Convention on Climate Change institutionalised a differentiated 
interpretation of universal participation, as evident in Article 3: 
 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations 
of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
                                                 
2 While the North and South agreed on the merit of this principle, they justified its inclusion in different ways. The 
South argued that the North should take the lead to reflect their share of the historical responsibility for generating the 
threat of climate change, whereas the North agreed to take the lead as a reflection of their financial and technical 
capabilities.  
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responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should 
take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof (UN, 1992, 5). 
 
 
Nevertheless, the representation of climate change as a global problem rendered the norm of universal 
participation susceptible to reinterpretation. As a consequence, the integrity of the norm began to weaken 
within months of the convention entering into force on 21 March 1994. The first most explicit illustration of 
this was Germany’s proposal to further differentiate the developing countries and begin the discussion of 
limiting emissions growth in the ‘more advanced developing countries’ (GFME 1994, 3). Although 
complete consensus among the developing countries was rare during the climate change negotiations, the 
South was unified in its opposition to the German proposal, which was subsequently abandoned (IISD 
1995; Agarwal et al 1999, 44). Although Germany regretfully accepted the opposition to further 
differentiation and consideration of commitments for developing countries, the United States ensured that 
these ideas remained on the negotiating agenda. While ostensibly maintaining support for the CBDR 
principle, the US announced in 1995 that it was time to consider commitments from developing countries. 
In accordance with Germany’s earlier proposal, the US raised the possibility of establishing new categories 
and corresponding commitments for developing countries (UNFCCC 1995, 183). Both Germany and the 
United States justified their proposals on the grounds that stabilising GHG concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a “safe” level would only be possible if future GHG emissions in both the developed and developing 
countries were limited. Already, then, two distinct interpretations of CBDR were discernible: one 
emphasising the necessary responsibility that the South should assume, and the other emphasising the 
historical responsibility and moral obligations which should be assumed by the North. Although the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997 re-institutionalised the CBDR principle without imposing quantifiable commitments on 
the South, the appropriate interpretation of this principle has been subject to continued contestation, in 
particular from the United States and Australia.  
 
In addition to this norm concerning who should bear responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
the initial norm concerning how such reductions should be made has also met with contestation. Indeed, the 
idea that mitigation should be pursued through domestic targets to reduce greenhouse gases enjoyed only a 
brief period of stability during the 1980s, since which time it has been consistently challenged in various 
ways. The emergence of greenhouse gas emissions as an issue of political concern coincided with the 
signing of two agreements which sought to limit other atmospheric pollutants. The Montreal Protocol and 
the European Community’s Large Combustion Plant (LCP) Directive were based on the assumption that 
mitigating the damage of CFCs and sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide, respectively, required states to 
adopt domestic emissions reduction targets and timetables. Consequently, it was taken for granted by many 
state and non-state actors that an international agreement on climate change mitigation would also be based 
on domestic targets (Grubb 1990, 71-2). This was reflected in numerous declarations and policies in the 
lead up to the creation of the FCCC in 1992. The ‘International Conference of the Changing Atmosphere: 
Implications for Global Security’, convened by the Canadian Government in 1988, called for a reduction in 
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global CO2 emissions of twenty percent by the year 2005 (Bodansky 1993, 462). This target, or a similar 
target, was subsequently adopted by a number of states and cities, including Denmark, Norway, the 
Netherlands, Japan and Australia (IEA 1992, 24-5). Similarly, the European Community implemented a 
climate change policy in 1990 which pledged to stabilise the Community’s CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by 
the year 2000 (Grubb 1995, 43). Nevertheless, by the time the Inter-governmental Negotiating Committee 
(INC) meetings commenced in 1991, divisions within the North over the appropriate design of a framework 
convention were clearly apparent. While the EU continued to support a focus on targets and timetables, this 
approach was strongly opposed by the US who pushed, instead, for a framework convention based on more 
general national programs and strategies (Bodansky 1993, 478). The resulting convention featured only 
qualitative commitments for Annex I parties, referring to such activities as compiling national GHG 
inventories, national strategies, and reporting. Crucially, the final text excluded reference to the stabilisation 
of GHG emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000, despite the fact that this quantitative commitment 
appeared in an earlier draft (Agarwal et al 1999, 38-9). Instead, it was agreed that such specific matters 
should be negotiated later as part of a legal instrument to supplement the framework convention. 
Accordingly, the Kyoto Protocol, established in 1997, re-institutionalised the idea that mitigation should be 
pursued via domestic targets, albeit in a rather compromised form. In contrast to earlier environmental and 
atmospheric agreements, the Kyoto Protocol tied domestic targets to a set of ‘flexible mechanisms’ which 
would enable states to meet their commitments in the most cost-efficient manner by investing in GHG 
mitigation in less-developed countries, or buying emissions credits through a trading system (UN 1997).  
 
In the absence of appropriate legal codes, the normative structures of climate governance initially 
established the boundaries of appropriate conduct for responding to the problem. Defining who should take 
responsibility for mitigating climate change, and how such mitigation should be pursued, the norms 
outlined above guided state behaviour and shaped the agendas of the preliminary negotiations. However, 
norms are not fixed and immutable; instead, they are dynamic and open to contestation and re-interpretation 
(Hoffmann 2005, 164-67). Consequently, the normative structures of climate governance have evolved 
throughout the years since climate change first emerged as an issue of political concern.  
 
DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON THE ACCEPTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
 
In seeking to explain cross-national variation in the diffusion of international norms, a number of 
International Relations scholars have emphasised the conditioning role of domestic actors, institutions, and 
political culture (Checkel 1999; Risse-Kappen 1994; Cortell and Davis 1996). Keck and Sikkink note that 
‘…international norms must always work their influence through the filter of domestic structures and 
domestic norms, which can produce important variations in compliance and interpretation of these norms’ 
(1998, 893). 
 
 - 6 -
The successful diffusion of a particular international norm requires a reasonable degree of congruence 
between the norm and the domestic conditions of those states it seeks to govern. A perceived incongruence 
may prompt domestic actors to build congruence between the norm and the domestic conditions through a 
process of re-interpretation and re-representation. Acharya refers to this process as localization (2004). Yet 
this perceived incongruence may also lead domestic actors to contest or reject the international norm, which 
may in turn affect the stability of the international normative structure. 
 
As revealed in the preceding section, the normative structures of climate governance have been altered 
through the process of contestation, which suggests that many states have not been able to build a necessary 
degree of congruence between the norms and their domestic conditions. The domestic conditions which 
affect a state’s response to international norms are both material and ideational in nature and comprise the 
domestic social structure, and the key actors’ identities and interests. The constitutive and interrelated 
elements of the domestic social structure are depicted in Diagram 1. 
 
 
Diagram 1 here 
 
 
To avoid the structural-bias that is pervasive in norms literature, the conditioning power of social structure 
must be augmented by consideration of the mutually-constitutive relationship of structure and agency, as 
captured by the theory of structuration (Wendt 1987). This implies that structure constrains and enables the 
behaviour of actors, but that structure itself is reproduced and transformed through actors’ behaviour.  
Although the social structure has the power to shape actors’ actions and decisions by influencing their 
understandings of self-identity and interests (O’Neill et al 2004, 162), it is not necessarily static. The social 
structure is amenable to change due to the capacity of actors to reinterpret their interests and introduce new 
ideas which, if accepted as legitimate, can result in a reconfiguration of the social structure. 
 
Those norms that are most highly prioritised in the social structure at any given time empower certain 
actors within the state and international society over others. These key actors derive their legitimacy and 
authority from the social structure; that is, from the national episteme, political system, institutionalised 
norms, and material resources. Consequently, their decisions and behaviour tend to reinforce the existing 
social structure and their own authority.  These key actors, their identities and interests, together with the 
social structure, constitute the domestic conditions that affect a state’s internalisation of international 
norms.  
 
To demonstrate how this theory manifests in the governance of climate change, the following three sections 
of this paper will examine the response of Australia’s foreign policy-makers to the climate change problem. 
Firstly I will discuss the domestic conditions and assess their congruence, or perceived congruence, with the 
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normative structures of climate governance. Next, I will turn my attention to the particular ways in which 
Australian foreign policy-makers have contested these normative structures and sought to construct 
alternative governance processes. Finally, in the concluding section of the paper, I will discuss the efforts of 
Australian foreign policy-makers to reconcile the policy challenge of climate change and the domestic 
conditions by re-framing the issue of climate change. 
 
AUSTRALIA'S DOMESTIC CONDITIONS 
 
Domestic Social Structure 
The first component of Australia’s social structure is the national episteme, namely, ‘…the taken-for-
granted lens through which actors look at the world’ (Kornprobst 2007, 70). Since colonial settlement in 
1788, successive Australian governments have maintained an unwavering commitment to developmentalist 
policies. Indeed, this commitment has become so entrenched in government rationality that its virtues are 
unquestioned; the development imperative is considered natural and self-evidently positive. It is in this way 
that ‘developmentalism’ has become the national episteme of Australia. As the ‘taken-for-granted lens’ 
though which Australian political leaders and policy-makers look at the world, developmentalism defines 
the boundaries of imaginable conduct. It is important to note that the conception of development which 
constitutes the national episteme does not encompass the broader principles of human welfare, human 
dignity, and ecological integrity; instead, development is understood primarily in economic terms or, more 
specifically, with the idea of economic growth (Horne 1983, 275). The developmentalist episteme has 
passed through a series of phases throughout Australia’s history, with each phase characterised by a slightly 
different degree and type of government involvement.3 The most recent materialisation of 
developmentalism has been called ‘state-sponsored marketisation’ (Walker 1999, 81). Emerging in the 
1980s, state-sponsored marketisation has been marked by de-regulation, privatisation, and the opening up 
of the national economy to global market forces (Walker 1999, 34-35). This present phase of 
developmentalism coincides with the global rise of ‘international competition’ as a hegemonic discourse. In 
the pursuit of greater international competitiveness, successive governments over the last three decades 
have sought to capitalise on Australia’s abundant reserves of natural resources, thereby reinforcing this 
country’s dependence on non-renewable ‘natural capital’ for its economic prosperity. Both Labor and 
Liberal governments have sought to expand the fossil fuel energy sector by abolishing export controls and 
encouraging other governments to open up their markets to Australia’s energy resource exports (Yu and 
Taplin 2000, 109). At present, there are no signs of a shift in these trends, especially in light of John 
Howard’s recent pronouncements of his desire to see Australia realise its potential as an “energy 
superpower” (Howard 2006).  
 
                                                 
3 For the sake of brevity I will not discuss the earlier phases of developmentalism in this paper. For a useful overview 
see Walker 1999; and Wanna and Weller 2003.   
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The second component of Australia’s social structure is its liberal-democratic system. Notwithstanding the 
many positive attributes of such a political system, numerous scholars have noted the constraining effect of 
the liberal-democratic tradition on the formulation of long-term environmental policies (e.g. Christoff 2005, 
41). The tendency for short election terms to produce short-sighted policies is perhaps the most obvious. In 
an effort to maintain the support of voters, Australia’s political leaders are generally reluctant to consider 
any policy which entails a delayed pay-off while imposing a cost on the current electorate (Christoff 2005, 
41). Furthermore, the nature of the national episteme precludes serious consideration of policies that may 
impede economic growth. As a result of the significant emphasis that has been placed on economic 
development and growth, these objectives have now become the yardstick for measuring the success or 
failure of a government’s term in power. The widespread belief that the electorate rewards good economic 
management has led political leaders to disproportionately privilege and protect economic indicators over 
social and environmental indicators (Head 1986, 55). This characteristic of the Australian social structure 
has been particularly influential in conditioning the response to the normative structures of international 
climate governance.  
 
The third component of the domestic social structure is the collection of norms that have already been 
institutionalised. The domestic social structure is obviously comprised of a large number of norms which 
govern different aspects of social conduct; here I will only highlight the four norms that have affected 
Australia’s response to the threat of climate change. As noted earlier, norms tend to be organised 
hierarchically within the social structure and the most highly prioritised norms will generally have most 
influence on actors’ behaviour. Diagram 2 illustrates the hierarchical order of the norms relevant to climate 
governance. The political economic norms at the base of the diagram are inextricably connected to the 
national episteme and are, consequently, hierarchically superior to the environmental governance norms. In 
such cases where the environmental norms cannot be reconciled with the political economic norms, we 
could expect that the former would be temporarily abandoned. 
 
Diagram 2 here 
 
 
In addition to the national episteme, political system, and already-institutionalised norms, Australia’s 
domestic social structure is also constituted by its material resources. Australia is a country very rich in 
natural resources and the presence of vast reserves of coal, natural gas, uranium, and various minerals has 
shaped the country’s economy. Australia’s material prosperity can largely be attributed to its considerable 
natural wealth. Energy exports, for example, presently earn more than $24 billion dollars each year (CoA 
2004, 1), but this sector employs only a small percentage of Australian workforce (Christoff 2002, 8). 
Moreover, the large reserves of fossil fuels have provided energy-intensive industries, businesses, and 
households with energy that is much cheaper than in most countries of the developed world (CoA 2004, 
10). In terms of energy resources, Australia’s substantial fossil fuel reserves are complemented by large 
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reserves of non-fossil fuel based energy resources, especially solar and wind. However, the potential of 
renewable energy sources has been comparatively ignored in favour of non-renewable energy sources 
(Riedy 2005, 216). Furthermore, as Yu and Taplin have noted, successive Australian governments have 
failed to take advantage of the country’s substantial human capital and high technological potential by 
focusing, instead, on the export of non-renewable energy, minerals, and agricultural products (2000, 110). 
The result is an economy that ‘lacks structural diversity’ (Yu and Taplin, 2000, 110). 
 
Domestic Actors 
Consideration of the domestic conditions that have affected Australia’s response to the normative structures 
of climate governance would be incomplete without understanding the actors that are embedded in the 
social structure, and their corresponding identities and interests. In accordance with the theory of 
structuration, these actors and the social structure are mutually-constituted: the social structure constrains 
and enables the behaviour of key actors, but the structure itself is reproduced and transformed through these 
actors’ behaviour. While the social structure has the potential to change if the key actors reconsider their 
identities and interests and alter their behaviour accordingly, stability of the structure is the norm. 
 
Numerous actors are privileged and empowered in different contexts by Australia’s domestic social 
structure. My purpose in this section is to identify only those actors who have most significantly affected 
Australia’s response to the normative structures of climate governance, namely those involved in foreign 
policy-making. Although jurisdiction for environmental matters traditionally sits with the States and 
Territories, the Australian Constitution authorises the federal government to make decisions on matters that 
have an international dimension or entail international obligations. In terms of public policy, then, climate 
change can be appropriately understood as an issue of foreign policy, which lies within the jurisdiction of 
the executive government (Firth 2005, 4). In the context of climate change, foreign policy-making is 
restricted to the prime minister, foreign minister, trade minister, environment minister, the Cabinet, and 
their respective advisors (Firth 2005, 76). 
 
Since this issue first arose on the international political agenda, Australia has seen a change in national 
government, and therefore foreign policy-makers, once. From the late 1980s until 1996, the Labor Party was 
in power; and since 1996 a coalition government of the Liberal and National parties has been in power. The 
behaviour of foreign policy-makers in both of these governments strongly reflects the national epistemic and 
normative dimensions of the domestic social structure; in particular it reflects a strong commitment to the 
idea of international competitiveness. However differences in their identities and worldviews have produced 
a slightly different style of foreign policy-making and, subsequently, a slightly different response to the 
normative structures of climate governance. The worldview of Labor’s foreign policy-makers reflected a 
blend of Idealism and Realism and is perhaps best described as moderately internationalist. Through this 
lens, cooperation among states in the international community was seen as necessary and desirable to 
achieve common interests as well as Australia’s own national interests. This worldview is reflected most 
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explicitly in the notion of ‘good international citizenship’, which became a core principle of Australia’s 
identity during the years of the Hawke and Keating governments (Devetak and True 2006, 244). This 
principle recognises the importance of balancing the pursuit of national interests with fulfilling Australia’s 
responsibilities and obligations as a member of the international community. Good international citizenship 
was considered not merely an idealistic stance or ‘disinterested altruism’, but also a pragmatic approach 
necessitated by an increasingly interdependent international environment (Evans and Grant 1995, 35).  
 
Labor’s election defeat in 1996 signalled a shift in Australia’s approach to foreign affairs. In contrast to the 
moderate internationalism which characterised the worldview and identity of the Hawke and Keating Labor 
governments, foreign policy-makers of the Howard Government have been guided by a strictly Realist 
understanding of the world. This worldview emphasises the primacy of the nation-state within the 
international order, underscores the importance of Australia’s alliance with the United States, and interprets 
multilateralism as a potential challenge to state sovereignty (Devetak and True 2006, 250). In accordance 
with Australia’s national episteme, Howard’s foreign policy-makers maintain an economistic conception of 
globalisation in which this is a process purely of liberal economic interdependence (Devetak and True 2006, 
254; Reus-Smit, 2002, 4). While the economic aspects of globalisation are undeniably crucial, such an 
exclusive understanding of globalisation fails to acknowledge the cultural, environmental, and political 
aspects of the compression of time and space (Reus-Smit, 2002, 4). The identity Australia has projected 
under the present government is evidently Janus-faced. In the context of economic globalisation, Australia is 
adaptive and cooperative: willing to exploit the opportunities presented by liberalisation; however in the 
context of non-economic institutional integration, Australia is resolutely sovereign and resistant to normative 
structures that are not entirely consistent with the national interest (Reus-Smit 2002, 7).   
 
In sum, the identities and interests of Australia’s foreign policy-makers throughout the last two decades are 
inextricably bound up in the domestic social structure. Although policy-makers of both political persuasions 
have coalesced around the fundamental objective of maximising Australia’s international competitiveness, 
the slight differences in their worldviews have affected the pursuit of this objective. In pursuing their 
conception of the national interest, realist foreign policy-makers have tended to eschew inclusive 
multilateral fora in favour of selective partnerships, while moderately internationalist foreign policy-makers 
tempered this pursuit with a belief in the importance of good international citizenship.   
 
AUSTRALIA’S CONTESTATION OF THE NORMATIVE STRUCTURES OF CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 
 
As noted earlier, a positive response to international norms requires a reasonable level of congruence 
between the norms and the domestic conditions. Like norms, domestic conditions are not immutable but they 
do have a tendency to remain stable. While the key domestic actors may re-interpret their interests and 
identities in light of emerging international norms, a perceived incongruence between the norms and the 
domestic social structure is likely to impede such a response. The subordinate norms of environmental 
governance, which are evident in Australia’s social structure, render foreign policy-makers somewhat 
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receptive to international efforts to control atmospheric pollutants. Nevertheless, the normative structures of 
climate governance pose an enormous challenge to the inherited objectives of foreign policy. The obligation 
to control GHG emissions, which lies at the core of these normative structures, directly contradicts the 
national episteme that emerged in conditions of abundant and cheap fossil fuel resources. An obligation to 
control GHG emissions has inconvenient implications for domestic energy consumption and the pursuit of 
international competitiveness. Moreover, the CBDR principle has been interpreted as providing Australia’s 
competitors with an unfair advantage in attracting international investment.4 This perceived incongruence 
between the normative structures of climate governance and the domestic conditions has led Australia’s 
foreign policy-makers to contest and re-interpret these structures. However, this was not initially the case. 
Influenced by the notion of ‘good international citizenship’ (and perhaps also by a ‘veil of ignorance’ 
(Bodansky 1993, 476; Young 1989, 232-33)), Australia played a more constructive role in cooperative 
efforts on climate change when the issue first emerged on the international political agenda. Illustrative is 
the adoption of an Interim Planning Target in 1990, based on the Toronto Target. This was followed by the 
drafting of a national strategy of ‘light-handed regulation’ to control domestic GHG emissions and meet 
Australia’s obligations under the FCCC (Bulkeley 2001, 158-9). Although the final draft and 
implementation of the strategy were widely deemed inadequate for meeting these obligations, the adoption 
of the IPT and the efforts to devise a national strategy do reflect a general acceptance of the international 
norms.  
 
By 1995, though, Australian foreign policy-makers had begun to contest these norms. Perhaps the earliest 
manifestation of this was at the first Conference of the Parties, in Berlin, where Australia supported the 
United States in calling for ‘meaningful participation’ on the part of developing countries, especially the 
‘more advanced developing countries’ referred to in Germany’s earlier proposal (Agarwal et al 1999, 45). In 
1996, in a further attempt to redefine the institutionalised norm of CBDR, Australia’s foreign policy-makers 
began to push for a differentiated approach to reduction targets based on ‘…projected emissions trends; 
factors such as population growth; and considerations embodied in trade’ (IISD 1996). Such a conception of 
differentiation was clearly informed by an interest in maintaining Australia’s international competitiveness 
and reducing the domestic costs of conforming with an international mitigation agreement. Australia 
attracted considerable criticism over its insistence on differentiated and favourable treatment, which was 
ostensibly warranted on the basis of Australia’s unique geographic, economic, and demographic features 
(Australia 1997, 10921). Yet Australia’s foreign policy-makers, now under the Howard Coalition 
Government, continued to push for differentiation and consequently secured a favourable target in the Kyoto 
Protocol of 108 percent above 1990 emission levels. The only other Parties to secure an increase on their 
emission levels were Norway and Iceland. 
 
                                                 
4 This interpretation is evident in statements made throughout the past decade by Australia’s foreign policy-makers.  
See, for example, Downer and Kemp 2002; and Kemp 2002. 
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By 1997 the shift in worldview of Australia’s foreign policy-makers was becoming apparent. This is 
revealed most clearly in the foreign affairs and trade White Paper, In the National Interest, which was 
released in August. Reflecting a realist worldview, this document emphasises the sovereign state as the 
principal actor in the international system. Accordingly, it is assumed that Australia’s foreign relations 
should be pursued predominantly via bilateral channels with other nation-states. Multilateral institutions also 
have a role to play, but only insofar as the objectives of such institutions align with Australia’s own core 
interests, identified as ‘…the security of the Australian nation and the jobs and standard of living of the 
Australian people’ (CoA 1997, iii). Importantly, the document alludes to a possible shift from broad 
multilateral cooperation to a strategy of ‘coalition-building’, namely ‘…putting together issues-based 
coalitions of countries to pursue a shared objective’ (CoA 1997, vi). Whereas multilateral institutions tend to 
rely on compromise and bargaining, coalition-building appears to be based on selective cooperation only 
with like-minded states. All of this points to a view of the world in which nation-states must fiercely protect 
their national interests from the intrusion and interference of regimes pursuing global interests; unless of 
course those interests are economic, in which case cooperation is necessary and inevitable. The image of 
Australia standing strong against a multilateral regime, in defence of the national interest, was repeatedly 
projected throughout 1997 in the context of climate change. In reference to Australia’s advocacy of its 
differentiation approach, John Howard stated in June 1997: ‘I will just continue to put Australia’s case…  
and if at the end of the day we are not successful in obtaining accommodation well, the arrangement will not 
be something that we can be part of’ (1997). This remark points to an fundamental shift away from 
Australia’s erstwhile identity as a ‘good international citizen’. Indeed, as Howard himself later defiantly 
acknowledged, many domestic critics labelled Australia an ‘international pariah’ for its stance on this issue 
(1998).  
 
Australia’s contestation of the normative structures of climate governance has not been limited to the CBDR 
principle. Australian foreign policy-makers were also strongly in favour of redefining the norm concerning 
how mitigation should be pursued. Following the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the use of the 
flexibility mechanisms remained an unresolved matter. Disagreement centred around the appropriate type of 
mechanisms and the extent of their use. The EU and many developing countries were in favour of placing a 
cap on the use of flexibility mechanisms, as a means of ensuring domestic targets were met largely through 
domestic action (Cass 2005, 38-40). Conversely, with a view to prevent any interruption to Australia’s own 
developmentalist trajectory, Australia strongly opposed any restrictions on the use of these mechanisms 
(IISD 1998). Australia’s push for maximum flexibility extended also to the type of projects that should be 
permitted. Whereas several Parties were reluctant to include such projects as carbon ‘sinks’ and nuclear 
reactors in the mechanisms, Australia’s delegation argued that decisions concerning the exclusion of certain 
projects should be made by individual developing countries on a case-by-case basis  (IISD 1998). 
 
In spite of the favourable concessions that Australian foreign-policy makers had secured through the existing 
processes of climate governance, in 2001 Australia began to focus on establishing alternative processes. This 
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was precipitated by the announcement of newly-elected US president, George W. Bush, that the Kyoto 
Protocol would not be submitted to the US Senate for domestic ratification. In contrast to the condemnation 
this decision drew from Europe, Japan, New Zealand, environmentalist groups, and other members of the 
international community (Mann 2001; Anon 2001; Anon 2001b), Australia’s response was supportive 
(Howard 2001). In an allusion to the pending directional change in Australia’s approach to climate 
governance, in April 2001, Robert Hill (then Environment Minister), raised the idea of redesigning the 
‘international architecture’ of climate governance: ‘(i)f the United States has … determined that the Protocol 
is unacceptable … we will want to explore with the United States its views on the international architecture 
which can deliver an optimal global response’ (2001). 
 
Accordingly, following the Government’s re-election in November 2001, Australia’s foreign policy-makers 
became more focused on coalition-building at the expense of constructively contributing to the multilateral 
processes of the UNFCCC. In 2002 and 2003, Australia established bilateral partnerships with four countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region: the US, Japan, New Zealand, and China (AGO 2007). In contrast to the Kyoto 
Protocol’s focus on emissions reductions, these partnerships were based on technological development, the 
sharing of expertise, and promoting greater participation in responding to climate change. This new 
emphasis on bilateral climate change partnerships coincided with John Howard’s formal announcement that 
Australia would not be ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. In the same week that the EU and Japan ratified the 
Protocol, Howard told Parliament: ‘(t)he Australian national interest does not lie in ratifying Kyoto: that is 
why we are opposed to it’ (Australia 2002). Without more active participation from developing countries 
and the US, Howard argued, the Kyoto Protocol would damage Australian industry and cost Australian jobs. 
The most significant manifestation of Australia’s efforts to construct alternative processes of climate 
governance was the creation, in July 2005, of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate: a selective multilateral initiative between the United States, Australia, Republic of Korea, China, 
India, and Japan. According to the Partnership’s initial Communiqué, one of the key objectives of the 
initiative is to ‘…work together to develop, demonstrate and implement cleaner and lower emissions 
technologies that allow for the continued economic use of fossil fuels while addressing air pollution and 
greenhouse gas emissions’ (DFAT 2006). In contrast to the focus of the UNFCCC on the direct reduction of 
GHG emissions through national targets and timetables, the Asia-Pacific Partnership places its faith in 
uncertain “clean” technology, and potentially in nuclear energy, to mitigate the accumulation of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere while exploiting all available sources of energy. Despite being framed as “clean” 
and “green”, Australia’s favoured technology is not benign renewable energy, but rather the capture and 
underground storage of carbon emitted from the burning of coal (Diesendorf 2003).  
 
RECONCILING CLIMATE GOVERNANCE WITH THE DOMESTIC CONDITIONS 
 
The normative structures of climate governance which emerged in the late 1980s were unambiguously 
centred around the objective of stabilising GHG emissions. As noted earlier, these structures consequently 
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pose an enormous challenge to the inherited objectives of Australia’s foreign policy, which have themselves 
emerged from the developmentalist episteme. Rather than questioning these objectives and re-considering 
them in light of the challenge of climate change, Australia’s foreign policy-makers have focused on re-
framing the issue of climate change to produce a superficial level of congruence between climate 
governance and the domestic conditions. Entman’s definition of framing is useful for understanding the 
efforts of foreign policy-makers to reconcile climate governance with the domestic conditions. He writes:  
 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 




International debates about climate change have tended to frame the issue narrowly in scientific and 
technical terms. Although the mandate of the International Panel on Climate Change encompasses the socio-
economic dimensions as well as the scientific and technical dimensions of climate change, these more 
normative dimensions have been considerably neglected in the Panel’s research agenda (IPCC 2007).  This 
agenda has tended to be preoccupied with establishing greater certainty of atmospheric processes through the 
use of computerised models. These models obviously have no way of accounting for, or explaining, the 
meanings that societies attach to GHG emissions, or the human practices with which these gases are 
associated. Consequently, the social and human dimensions of the issue tend to be overlooked. Divorced 
from its social and human foundations, the issue of climate change has entered the policy domain dominated 
by an economic discourse of efficiency: a discourse which recognises value exclusively in monetary terms 
and reduces the viability of environmental policies to narrow cost-benefit calculations. 
 
The international framing of the issue of climate change within the narrow confines of atmospheric 
processes and cost-efficiency has provided an opportunity for Australian foreign policy-makers to re-frame 
the issue for their own purposes. The rejection of the Kyoto Protocol on the basis of its differentiation of 
developed and developing countries can only be sustained if the social and human dimensions of the issue 
are obscured. Australia annually generates 27.54 tonnes of GHG emissions for each person living in this 
country. In contrast, China generates 3.05 tonnes per person, and India just 1.34 tonnes (Carbon Planet 
2007). Yet, these figures tend to be cast aside in favour of highlighting the aggregate contribution of China 
and India to global GHG emissions and subsequently concluding that their emissions must be controlled. 
The effect of such framing is to present Australia’s own domestic emissions as inconsequential and 
irrelevant. Indeed, on numerous occasions in recent years, Australia’s foreign policy-makers have parroted a 
former industry adviser in claiming that ‘(i)f Australia closed down completely tomorrow, it wouldn't make 
one iota’s difference to the global greenhouse position’ (Quoted in Anon 1997), because China alone would 
negate any emissions reduction in just eleven months (Campbell 2005). Such framing obscures the energy 
consumption associated with each tonne of GHG emissions and thereby conflates subsistence emissions and 
luxury emissions: the consumption associated with each Indian’s annual 15 gigajoules of energy is weighted 
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equally in importance to the consumption associated with each Australian’s 250 gigajoules (source of data: 
Smil 2003). The pursuit of international competitiveness cannot accommodate such considerations of 
equitable consumption; as a consequence, Australia’s foreign policy-makers have sought to sideline these 
considerations by re-focusing the debate. This is particularly apparent in the ‘technology-driven’ approach of 
the alternative governance structures promoted by Australia. Instead of re-considering the way energy is 
used and addressing the difficult question of how much must be consumed to maintain a desirable level of 
wellbeing, Australia’s foreign policy-makers have sought to continue along the inherited developmentalist 
trajectory by focusing on the development of technology capable of mitigating the negative effects of over-
consumption and globally inequitable consumption.  
 
The role of historical greenhouse gas emissions in generating the threat of climate change has also been 
displaced in Australia’s framing of the issue. In contrast to the CBDR principle, which many understand as 
obliging the North to take the lead in reducing emissions as a reflection of their historical responsibility, the 
alternative governance structures promoted by Australia place chief responsibility on the South, on the basis 
of their future projected emissions. A joint statement in which Australia’s foreign and environment ministers 
announced the creation of the Asia Pacific Partnership, is illustrative. In explaining the rationale for this 
initiative, they said: 
 
… we have never been afraid to state plainly that Kyoto does not - and will not – work…. 
Developing countries - those expected to account for over half of all greenhouse gas emissions 
by 2020 - have no Kyoto targets, and are - quite understandably - not willing to sacrifice 
economic growth to negotiate them…. The importance of developing country participation can 
be illustrated quite starkly. Australia accounts for only 1.4% of global greenhouse gas 
emissions. Even if Australia took the alarming step of closing every power station tonight, 
China’s industrial growth is so rapid that the greenhouse gas savings made by this gesture 
would be replicated by China in just one year. A long-term, effective response to climate 
change needs to be one that includes all major emitters (Downer and Campbell 2005). 
 
While the UNFCCC processes for responding to climate change posed a challenge to Australia’s own 
prospects for international competitiveness, this re-framing of the issue has effectively transferred this 
challenge to Australia’s regional competitors. This is evident in the Foreign Minister’s assertion, as noted in 
the introduction, that ‘(t)he Government is doing a lot, but in the end, what the Australian Government does 
is going to be of negligible importance compared to what China does or the United States does or India 
does – that’s where you’ve got to really address this issue’ (Downer 2006). While the deflection of attention 
away from Australia’s domestic emissions has allowed the Howard Government to protect the short-term 
material wealth of the country, it is clear that this has come at the expense of international equity and 
Australia’s long-term sustainability.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Climate change is a complex and multi-dimensional problem which carries important implications for 
environmental, social, cultural, economic, and political sustainability. It is unsurprising, then, that 
international efforts to govern climate change have met with strong resistance from a variety of state and 
non-state actors. Since this issue first appeared on the international political agenda nearly two decades ago, 
the norms concerning who should take responsibility for mitigating climate change, and how such 
mitigation should be pursued have gradually evolved through a process of contestation. The case of 
Australia has illustrated how this contestation emerged as a result of the perceived incongruence between 
the initial normative structures and the domestic conditions. In contrast to the initial normative structures of 
climate governance which emphasised the responsibility of the North to mitigate GHG emissions via 
domestic targets and timetables, the alternative approach promoted by Australia places chief responsibility 
on the South to control their emissions via technological means. This shift in the governance of climate 
change does not bode well for long-term sustainability and international equity.  
 
In this paper I have sought to develop a greater understanding of the relationship between international 
norms and domestic conditions, and an appreciation of the importance of congruence, by exploring this 
relationship in the context of Australian foreign policy-makers’ response to the governance of climate 
change. However, a greater understanding of the relationship between international norms and domestic 
conditions generates a significant challenge for norm entrepreneurs and other members of the international 
community. If the successful diffusion of a particular norm is dependent on its congruence with the 
domestic conditions of those states it seeks to govern, the capacity of the international community to 
adequately respond to complex and threatening transnational problems is significantly compromised. The 
challenge for norm entrepreneurs and other relevant actors is to promote a process of localisation and 
congruence-building that legitimises the existing norms while ensuring that the initial objectives of 
governance are not undermined. This is indeed a matter which merits further research within the discipline 
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Diagram 1: Domestic social structure.5 
                                                 
5 This conception of the domestic social structure is informed by the work of Bernstein 2001, 186; Kornprobst 2007; 





















 Diagram 2: Hierarchy of Australian Norms6 
 
 
                                                 
6 For further discussion on the first environmental governance norm, see Christoff 2005b, 27-30. For further 
discussion on the second environmental governance norm, see Papadakis and Grant 2003.  
Political Economic Norms 
 
1. In a liberal democracy, the government should avoid policies that may antagonise 
voters in the present election term. 
2. Given that government success is measured by economic growth, maximising growth 
rates should be treated as the most fundamental priority of policy-makers. 
Environmental Governance Norms 
 
1. Environmental degradation can negatively affect future 
productivity and should therefore be managed. 
2. Environmental degradation should be managed through 
‘light-handed regulation’. 
